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Abstract—Modern society generates an incredible amount of
data about individuals, and releasing summary statistics about
this data in a manner that provably protects individual privacy
would offer a valuable resource for researchers in many fields. We
present the first algorithm for analysis of variance (ANOVA) that
preserves differential privacy, allowing this important statistical
test to be conducted (and the results released) on databases
of sensitive information. In addition to our private algorithm
for the F test statistic, we show a rigorous way to compute
p-values that accounts for the added noise needed to preserve
privacy. Finally, we present experimental results quantifying
the statistical power of this differentially private version of the
test, finding that a sample of several thousand observations is
sufficient to detect variation between groups. The differentially
private ANOVA algorithm is a promising approach for releasing
a common test statistic that is valuable in fields in the sciences
and social sciences.
Index Terms—differential privacy, data privacy, statistics,
ANOVA
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of private data analysis is to gain useful informa-
tion from databases of personal information while at the same
time protecting the privacy of the individuals in the database.
This has traditionally been done using ad hoc “anonymization”
techniques, but in recent years these techniques have failed
on numerous occasions (ex., [1]–[3]). Differential privacy [4]
has emerged as a rigorous framework for providing provably
strong privacy while publicly disseminating useful information
about a data set.
Differential privacy is not a method for producing publish-
able output, but rather a sufficient condition that guarantees
privacy is protected with the level of protection parameterized
by a parameter . In order to satisfy differential privacy, the
information being published (generally summary statistics)
must in some way be randomized. In the simplest query
algorithms, random noise is added to the correct (but not
necessarily private) output. The result is often a good estimate
of the true value. Some schemes are more complicated, adding
noise in various ways during a computation. Differentially
private algorithms have been created to allow for the release
of simple summary statistics like means [4] and medians [5],
[6], as well as more elaborate statistical output, including
histograms [4], linear regressions [5], [7], [8], chi-squared tests
[9] and a variety of machine learning techniques.
In this paper, we present the first differentially private
algorithm for conducting a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA). This is a statistical test for settings with a categori-
cal independent variable and a continuous dependent variable.
It is a very widely used piece of statistical analysis and is used
as the primary test of significance for many studies in biology,
medicine, and the social sciences.
A one-way ANOVA outputs a test statistic called an F
statistic, which measures the ratio of the variation in means
of categories to variation of individual observations. Our algo-
rithm outputs an estimate of this value. However, F statistics
are not of interest directly, but rather as a tool for measuring
statistical significance of the result. One cannot simply look
up our noisy estimate of F in an F -distribution table to find a
p-value, because the noise makes extreme values more likely
than they would otherwise be.
Our second contribution is to give a rigorous method for
computing p-values. This means that our algorithm produces
final results that can be easily interpreted. (Most existing
algorithms do not output these sorts of results. For example,
algorithms for linear regression output only the best fit line,
which is useful for making predictions but not sufficient for
testing independence of two variables.)
Finally, we run a series of experiments to measure the
statistical power of our algorithm. That is, for a given
privacy parameter and effect size, we show the required
size of the database for the algorithm to indicate a statis-
tically significant result. This provides a quantitative anal-
ysis of the utility-privacy tradeoff under our algorithm and
provides a basis against which to compare future algo-
rithms that might seek to improve upon this work. Our
code is freely available at https://github.com/campbza/
Differentially-private-ANOVA.
II. BACKGROUND
Below we provide technical background on the two main topics
of our paper, differential privacy and the ANOVA statistical test.
A. Differential Privacy
Imagine your data is part of a database about which some
information is released. Intuitively, differential privacy guarantees
that the published output would be similarly likely regardless of the
specific values of your data. If the output is similarly likely regardless
of your data’s value, then someone seeing that output is unable to
meaningfully infer anything about you. (This inability to learn from
the output has been formalized and proven to be a consequence of
differential privacy. See [10] for more details.) Differential privacy
was introduced by Dwork et al. in 2006, and the core definition and
theorems presented below were all present in that initial work. [4]
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Formally, we consider two databases D and D′, each consisting
of n rows. (A “row” consists of all information connected to a given
record.) We say D and D′ are “neighboring” if they are the same
except for one altered row. A function f on the database is said to be
differentially private if the probability of any output of f is roughly
the same for any neighboring inputs D and D′.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A (randomized) algorithm f with
range R is -differentially private if for all S ⊆ R and for all
neighboring databases D and D′
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[f(D′) ∈ S].
We call  the privacy parameter, which is chosen by the user.
Differential privacy has many useful properties. Some, like those
mentioned above, guarantee that it really is sufficient to guarantee
privacy. Others allow for easier creation of private algorithms and
easier use of those algorithms in practice. Two properties in particular
will be useful to us here.
Theorem 1 (Composition). If f is 1-differentially private and g is
2-differentially private, then if h simply returns the outputs of both f
and g (i.e., h(D) = (f(D), g(D))) then h is (1 + 2)-differentially
private.
We will use this property to combine algorithms for intermediate
calculations into an algorithm for ANOVA as a whole. It also
means that our ANOVA algorithm can be combined with other
differentially private algorithms to conduct larger, more complex
statistical analyses.
The other useful property is resistance to post-processing:
Theorem 2 (Post-processing). If f is -differentially private and g
is an arbitrary function, then if h = g ◦ f (i.e., h(D) = g(f(D)))
then h is also -differentially private.
This property is primarily a sanity check on the definition, since
a good definition of privacy must have this property. In our case, it
also means that our process for converting a noisy F statistic into a
p-value maintains privacy.
We build our algorithm by using the standard Laplacian mecha-
nism for individual components and then combining the result. This
technique relies on knowing the sensitivity of certain computations.
This sensitivity is defined as the maximum effect that can occur when
a single row is changed.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a (deterministic) function
f on databases with real number outputs is the maximum over
neighboring databases D and D′ of |f(D)− f(D′)|.
We also define the Laplace distribution, for which this technique
is named:
Definition 3. The Laplace distribution (centered at 0) with scale b
is denoted Lap(b) and has probability density function
f(x) = e−|x|/b/2b.
We can now give the Laplacian mechanism, which gives a differ-
entially private algorithm for any function with a known bound on
sensitivity.
Theorem 3 (Laplacian mechanism). Let f be a function with
sensitivity at most s. Let L be a random variable drawn from
Lap(s/). Then the function f ′(D) = f(D) + L is -differentially
private.
B. ANOVA Testing
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) evaluates whether the
data is consistent with a null hypothesis under which all groups of
the categorical variable share the same mean for some continuous
response variable [11]. For example, it might test whether a choice
of treatment (ex., surgery, medication, or none) had an effect on the
mean life expectancy of patients with a particular disease. Deviation
from the null hypothesis is measured with an F statistic. If the
resulting F statistic is sufficiently unlikely to occur under the null
hypothesis, the analyst can safely conclude that average response is
not independent of group membership.
A database D for an ANOVA test contains n rows, each containing
a categorical variable that takes on one of k allowed values and
a continuous variable. (We will throughout this paper assume that
the continuous variable has been normalized and has allowed range
[0, 1].) We let yij represent the j th row in category i. We let yi
represent the mean of group i, and y represent the grand mean (i.e,
the mean of all values). We let ni be the number of values in group
i.
An ANOVA test produces an F statistic. This can be calculated
from two intermediate values. First is SSA, the sum of the squared
error of all sample means compared to the grand mean weighted
by the size of each group. This measures the variation between the
means of each group.
SSA(D) =
k∑
i=1
ni(yi − y)2.
The second intermediate value is SSE, the sum squared error of
all values compared to the grand mean. This measures the variation
among the data points as a whole.
SSE(D) =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(yij − yi)2.
The F statistic compares these two values. Intuitively, if all groups
are distributed identically, then the random variation between groups
should scale proportionately to the variation in individual values. If
the groups have different means, SSA will grow faster than SSE.
Therefore F is a ratio of SSA to SSE, with each adjusted to account
for their respective degrees of freedom.
F (D) =
SSA(D)/(k − 1)
SSE(D)/(n− k)
When sample sizes are large, the distribution of the F statistic
under the null hypothesis (given known values of k and n) is well-
known. Given a particular F statistic, one can compute the probability
that a value that high or higher would have occurred by random
chance if the null hypothesis was true. This is the p-value. A low
p-value (often 0.05 or less) is seen as “significant” and is taken as
reasonable evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected.
III. OUR ALGORITHM
Our algorithm uses the Laplacian mechanism defined previously.
In order to do so, we first prove sensitivity bounds on our queries.
We assume all data has been normalized so that yij values fall in
[0, 1] and that the number of possible groups k is fixed and public,
but the number of samples from each group is not known. The most
straightforward approach would be to bound the sensitivity of F , but
this is very difficult. Instead we bound the sensitivity of SSA and
SSE.
Theorem 4. Recall that
SSE(D) =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(yij − yi)2.
SSE has sensitivity bounded above by 7.
Proof. We must analyze the effect of changing a single data point
on SSE. There is a term in the sum for each data point, each with
a value in [0, 1]. The term corresponding to the changed data point
might change arbitrarily, so we bound this term’s contribution to the
change by 1.
Next we look at the effect that change has on the other terms
through its effect on yi and yj , where the data point’s change moves
it from group i to group j. (This is the worst case — changes that
don’t change the rows groups would have lesser effect.) Let ni and
nj be the number of terms (i.e., data points) in each group excluding
the data point being changed. We can bound the change’s effect on
yi by 1/ni. We are are therefore changing the value being squared
in each term, yij−yi, by at most 1/ni. In general, if you change a2
to (a+ b)2, the change is 2ab+ b2. Here we have a = yij − yi ≤ 1,
so we can bound this by 2b + b2. Plugging in b = 1/ni gives us a
per-term change of
2/ni + 1/n
2
i .
We then have ni terms affected by this change, for a total effect of
2 + 1/ni < 3.
Similarly, the effect on the terms in group j is bounded by 3. This
gives us a change of at most 1 for term corresponding to the row
being changed and a change of at most 3 for each of the two groups
of other terms this row affects, for a total sensitivity of 7.
Theorem 5. Recall that
SSA(D) =
k∑
i=1
ni(yi − y)2.
The sensitivity of SSA is bounded above by 9 + 5/n.
Proof. This proof follows the same logic as the previous one. Instead
of thinking of k terms, each weighted by ni, think of the sum as n
terms, with each group resulting in ni identical terms:
g(d) =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(yi − y)2
Again, the term corresponding to our changed data point can change
by 1. Other terms in group i see yi changed by 1/ni and y changed
by 1/n. Again this is a change from a2 to (a + b)2 but this time
b = 1/ni + 1/n. This gives us a per-term change of:
2(1/ni + 1/n) + (1/ni + 1/n)
2
=2/ni + 2/n+ 1/n
2
i + 2/nni + 1/n
2
We then sum this per-term change over ni terms to get a change of
2 + 2ni/n+ 1/ni + 2/n+ ni/n
2
≤ 3 + 2ni/n+ 2/n+ ni/n2
There is an identical bound on the total change in the terms repre-
senting group j, the group the data is moving to. Then we consider
the other terms. Say n∗ represents the number of terms not in either
of these groups. Each of those terms sees y change by at most 1/n.
With b = 1/n we get a total change of 2n∗/n+ n∗/n2.
We then add together those four separate bounds: the bound of 1
on the term’s own change; the bound on the total change of terms in
group i; the equivalent bound on change in group j; and the bound
on the rest of the terms.
1 + (3 + 2ni/n+2/n+ ni/n
2)+
(3 + 2nj/n+ 2/n+ nj/n
2)+
2n∗/n+ n∗/n2
≤ 7 + 2(ni + nj + n
∗)
n
+ 4/n+
ni + nj + n
∗
n2
Given that ni + nj + n∗ < n, this is bounded by
9 + 5/n.
Using these sensitivity bounds it is straightforward to construct
our algorithm. We compute estimates ŜSE and ŜSA of SSE and SSA
using the Laplacian mechanism, then combine the results to estimate
the F statistic. See Algorithm 1 for formal details.
Algorithm 1 Differentially private ANOVA
Input: Database D,  value
Compute ŜSA = SSA(D)+Z1 where Z1 ∼ Lap
(
9+5/n
/2
)
Compute ŜSE = SSE(D) + Z2 where Z2 ∼ Lap(7/(/2))
Compute F̂ = ŜSA/(k−1)
ŜSE/(n−k)
Output: F̂ , ŜSA, ŜSE
We now prove that this algorithm is -differentially private.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 is -differentially private.
Proof. By the sensitivity bounds of Theorems 4 and 5 and the known
Laplacian mechanism (Theorem 3) we know that the computations of
ŜSA and ŜSE are each /2-differentially private. By our composition
theorem (Theorem 1), outputting both is -differentially private.
Finally, since the computation of F̂ does not require access to the
database, Theorem 2 shows that it can be added to the output without
loss of privacy.
Note that while F̂ is the value of most immediate interest,
we can also output ŜSA and ŜSE without additional privacy loss.
These values can sometimes give other useful information about the
database “for free.” For example, ŜSE/(n− k) is an estimate of the
variance of the data, which might be of independent interest.
A. Computing p-values
Normally in an ANOVA test we get a value for F . We can then
refer to the known F -distribution to find the p-value, the probability
that the observed value, or more extreme, would have occurred by
chance under the null hypothesis. The higher the F -ratio, the lower
the p-value. However, our algorithm returns an approximation, F̂ ,
of the real F value. One could simply compare this value to the F
distribution and get an approximation of the true p-value, but one
could also be more thorough and actually compute a distribution for
F̂ values under the null hypothesis and compare to that distribution.
We do the latter.
Under the null hypothesis, SSA is drawn from σ2χ2k−1, the chi-
squared distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom scaled by the
variance σ2. SSE is similarly drawn from σ2χ2n−k. In the classic
setting, the σ2 factors cancel in the ratio, making the F distribution
independent of the variance of the underlying data points.
This is not true in our scenario. ŜSE is drawn from σ2χ2n−k +
Lap(7/(/2)). The added Laplacian noise makes the resulting ratio
dependent on σ2. Luckily, ŜSE/(n − k) is an estimate of σ2, and
we can use this estimate to accurately compute a distribution for F̂ .
To simulate a null hypothesis F̂ distribution we choose ŜSE
and ŜSA from the above distributions, using ŜSE/(n − k) as our
estimate of σ2. We repeat this a large number of times (100,000 in
our experiments).
When we see an output of Algorithm 1, we use the reported
ŜSE value to compute the above distribution for F̂ under the null
hypothesis. Then we look at the percentage of that distribution falling
above the particular value we saw for F̂ and return that as our p-value.
Note that this entire computation of p-value is done independently
of the database, using only the output of Algorithm 1. Therefore it
can be added to the algorithm as an additional output with no added
privacy cost.
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Fig. 1. The distribution of the F statistic (red) overlaid with distributions of
the estimate F̂ for two values of  (green and gold). In all cases, n = 10, 000
and k = 10. The significant difference between these curves indicates that
even though F̂ is an estimate of F , ignoring the added noise in F̂ produces
unacceptably inaccurate conclusions.
One of our key findings is that this added care in computing the
p-value is absolutely necessary. Consider the distributions shown in
Figure 1. Here we have shown the standard F distribution when
n = 10, 000 and k = 10, along with distributions of the estimate
F̂ when  = 1 and when  = 0.1. The dotted line shows the value
of the F statistic that would normally indicate statistical significance
with p = 0.05. However, at this point with  = 1 the true p-value
we calculate is 0.13. With  = 0.1 the true p-value at that point is
0.41.
IV. RESULTS
We assessed the power of our differentially-private ANOVA test
on synthetic data as we increased the database size n for different
privacy parameters . We generated normally-distributed data from
three equally-sized groups with the same standard deviation and three
different means. That is, the n values were comprised of n/3 values
drawn from N (0.35, 0.15), n/3 values drawn from N (0.5, 0.15),
and n/3 values drawn from N (0.65, 0.15). Values were truncated
to be within [0, 1]. We calculated estimates ŜSA, ŜSE, and F̂ , and
computed the p-value as described in Section III-A. We repeated
this procedure (data generation, private ANOVA test, and p-value
calculation) 1,000 times for (n,) pairs and recorded the proportion
of iterations that report a p-value less than 0.05.
For our simulated datasets, we selected databases ranging from ten
records to one million records, and privacy parameters ranging from
 = ∞ (non-private) to  = 0.01. The choice of an “acceptable”
 value is a policy question:  = .01 is extremely conservative and
allows for safe composition with many other queries, while  = 1
provides meaningful privacy protection but might be too high for the
comfort of some.
The power curves in Figure 2 quantify the number of records
needed to consistently yield statistically significant results for (n,)
pairs. In the non-private case (when  = ∞), databases with 100
records yield consistently significant F values over the 1,000 runs.
As the value of  decreases, more records are required to provide
statistically significant results; with  = 1 five to ten thousand data
points are needed to frequently see significance, while nearly one
million records are required when  = 0.01.
Whether these results are exciting or disappointing depends very
much on one’s reference point. On the one hand, databases with
several thousand values are extremely common, meaning that we can
now conduct ANOVA tests on a wide variety of real-world databases
while protecting privacy, something that was not previously possible.
On the other hand, the differentially private version is substantially
less powerful than the traditional non-private version.
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Fig. 2. Proportion of significant (p < 0.05) F -ratios for databases of different
sizes n and different privacy parameters . The p-values were calculated by
generating a distribution of F -ratios with variance estimated by ŜSE/(n−k).
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Fig. 3. Proportion of significant (p < 0.05) F -ratios for databases of different
sizes n and different privacy parameters . The p-values were calculated by
generating a distribution of F -ratios with the real (known) variance of 0.152.
We also verified that ŜSE/(n − k) is a sufficiently accurate
estimate of σ2 for the calculating p-values. We did this by running
the experiment a second time using the ground truth variance (0.152)
in the null distribution generation; this would be impossible in the
real world (where the true σ2 is not known), but it is guaranteed
to give accurate p-values. The result (Figure 3) is extremely similar
to our results using the estimated σ2, giving us confidence that this
estimate is acceptable for real world use.
Next, we evaluated the differentially-private F -ratios on data with
a smaller effect size. We generated six groups of values with means
[0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.6] and standard deviation 0.2, and again
truncated values to be within [0, 1]. We computed the proportion of
significant p-values as before. The increased number of groups and
the closer group means shift the power curves to the right (Figure 4),
but even in this setting, a database size on the order of 10,000 would
yield frequently significant p-values for privacy parameter  = 1.0.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We show that for practically-sized databases, one can execute
differentially private ANOVA tests with reasonable privacy guarantees
and convincing results. We also quantify exactly how much data is
needed to pick up an effect of a given size. This is an important
practical tool for data collection and analysis. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it gives a clear measurement of the efficacy of our algorithm
in real world terms, allowing for easy comparison between this work
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Fig. 4. Proportion of significant (p < 0.05) F -ratios on data with a smaller
effect size.
and future attempts to improve the power of differentially private
ANOVA testing.
This project is only a small step into what is a very large area
for exploration. There are other techniques for differentially private
algorithms that might yield more powerful results. We made some
attempts to use the propose-test-release framework of Dwork and Lei
[5] or the smooth sensitivity framework of Nissim et al. [6]. These
attempts gave us less effective algorithms than the one presented
here, but it is certainly possible that further work could find a better
algorithm.
We hope that presenting algorithms for differentially private equiv-
alents of frequently used statistical tests will make it easier for
practitioners in other fields to make use of differentially private
analysis and allow the useful study of data that was otherwise
inaccessible to researchers.
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